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Authoritative governments, like Chile in the 1970's and China today, have promoted trade 
openness. In the meantime, the "greatest democracy in the world", India, kept its domestic 
market quite closed. Democracies would leave free course to pressure from protectionist 
lobbies. In democracies, industrial lobbies are likely to be more organized than pro-trade 
consumers, because it is easier to control free-riding inside small groups than inside large 
ones. The votes that politicians risk to lose implementing protectionist measures may be 
regained through financial supports offered by protectionist-organized groups. 
However, in the 1980's, the general evolution towards free trade and democracy, particularly 
in the developing countries, discredits the idea that protectionist lobbies dominate democratic 
countries. Would democracies support trade openness? According to Mayer (1984), if the 
median voter owns less capital than the average, a labor-intensive democratic country should 
be a free trader. Indeed, according to the Stolper and Samuelson’s theorem, the real 
remuneration of labor increases when the tariffs decrease. Milner & Kubota (2003) use this 
theoretical approach to highlight a negative relation between tariffs and democracy. Granger 
& Siroën (2001) show that the respect of democratic principles exerts a direct influence on the 
volume of trade, which depends not only on "natural" factors but also on the choice of trade 
policy. This relationship takes a U shape: from initially low levels, openness decreases with 
the enforcement of democratic institutions, and increases after reaching a threshold, estimated 
to be between the level of democracy of Malaysia and Brazil. For Mansfield, Milner & 
Rosendorff (2000), the nature of trade policy is unpredictable in autocracies because it 
depends on particular interests of the dominating group.  
If the existing studies concern the incidence of democracy on trade openness, other questions 
should be asked. Does a transition to democracy lead to a reorientation of trade? Does 
democracy favor a singular type of trade partners? Do the democracies trade more with each 
other? 
Our study aims to answer these questions. Section I presents the methodological process 
adopted in this paper. Section II is devoted to a gravity model to quantify the influence of 
democracy on bilateral trade flows. 
                                                 
1 A more complete first draft of this paper has been presented to the EURIsCO’s seminar in june 2004. A final version is in process. It will 
expose new tests and panel estimations. This version has been exposed to the European Trade Study Group (ESTG) (Nottingham, September 
2004) and at the AFSE Congress (Paris, September 2004). We are grateful to Régis Bourbornnais, Jean-François Jacques, Marie Bessec, 
Christophe Hurlin, Bernard Guillochon, Eric Strobl, Lionel Fontagné and other participants for their useful comments. 
∗ EURIsCO, Université Paris-Dauphine. 2 
The methodological process 
In the literature, the political regime may have an incidence on bilateral trade flows through 
different ways. Here three of them are distinguished.  
Hypothesis 1:   Democratic countries would negotiate more easily reciprocal trade 
agreements.   
According to Mansfield, Milner & Rosendorff (2000), if there are divergent opinions in a 
country about the opportunity to reduce its own tariffs, everybody agrees with the openness of 
foreign markets. Even if legislators, influenced by specific or regional lobbies, are more 
protectionists than the executive component of power, they may accept trade measures 
opening the national market if reciprocally the other country makes similar concessions. 
Using a negotiation game, the authors conclude that two democracies are more likely to enter 
into a reciprocal trade agreement than a democracy-autocracy couple. They cannot conclude 
about the expected relations between two autocracies. In a different paper, the same authors 
(Mansfield, Milner & Rosendorff, 2002) assume that leaders are more protectionists than their 
electorate, which is, moreover, badly informed on their intentions. The electorate wrongly 
attributes bad economic performances to a restrictive trade policy and may punish the 
government for bad reasons. Then, an international trade agreement would signal a pro-trade 
commitment from their government in the aim to remove uncertainty on the responsibility of 
politicians. This function of the trade agreement would be all the clearer since it includes 
sanctions and trade policy review mechanisms, what is the case for the WTO and some 
regional agreements. The authors find an empirical evidence that the probability to have two 
countries inside a trade agreement increases when both are democratic.  
We can also argue in a different way. In accordance with the models inspired by the Stolper 
and Samuelson's theorem, democratic developing countries, where the median-voter is a 
worker, should prefer pro-trade policies. Thus, a reciprocal commitment is coherent with the 
preference of the country and thus more credible. A free trade agreement is likely to be 
effective. On the contrary, an agreement with a non-democratic country appears incoherent 
with leaders’ preference if the oligarchy concentrates a significant share of the capital. Many 
regional agreements, like the EU, the NAFTA or Mercosur, introduce a democratic constraint, 
which may be considered as a commitment to respect it. Provided that a democratic country is 
a free trader, a democratic constraint can be interpreted as a commitment in favor of free 
trade. Such a guarantee is an incentive to negotiate broader agreements. Although, the 
absence of democratic binding does not imply that partners are autocratic, the countries linked 
to some "democratic" preferential agreement are nevertheless expected to trade more between 
them than countries belonging to a non-democratic one.  
Hypothesis 2  – A democracy would adopt lower tariffs with partners having lower 
transaction costs.    
From Mayer’s model (Mayer, 1984), in a relatively labor abundant country, a voter owning 
less capital than the average (“worker”) should prefer a lower tariff since the import price, 
including transaction costs, is low. In a democratic country, if the median voter is a worker, 
the “elected” tariff will be weaker with a lower transaction cost. Duc, Granger & Siroën 
(2004) show that this relation holds at a bilateral level. Contrary to Mayer, they assume a total 
specialization. The expansion of the capital-intensive non-tradable sector (including public 
utilities) plays the same role in the factorial allocation as capital-intensive imports in the 3 
Mayer’s model. In equation [1] presented below,  ji ji t m ∂ ∂  is negative (mij country j’s imports 
from country i; (tji – 1), the tariff applied by j to i);  k φ  is the income share of the individual k 
in the factor income. If k is a “worker” (“capitalist”),  ji k t ∂ ∂φ  is negative (positive),  ji Ω  is also 
negative (positive) and the “elected” tariff is lower (higher). Moreover, for a given world 
price πi , the "worker" ("capitalist") will propose a lower (higher) tariff for a low (high) 
transaction cost βij. 
()
( )
 
  t
    t m
PIB
   1   t
k
ji k
ji ji i ji
j
kij φ
φ
π β
∂ ∂
× ∂ ∂ − = = ji     Ω + 1        [1] 
The broader the electorate is, the more the median voter is likely to be a "worker". If the 
tradable sector is relatively labor abundant, the median-voter will systematically chooses a 
tariff lower than the one preferred by the capitalist and a bilateral tariff significantly lower 
when the bilateral cost of transaction is low. Conversely, in non-democratic countries where 
the electorate is confined to a more restricted group, the median voter is likely to be a 
"capitalist" and weak transactions costs should be associated with higher tariffs.  
Hypothesis 3 - The costs of transaction would be weaker between a pair of democracies.   
In hypothesis 2, transaction costs are independent of the political regime. Actually, 
democratic regimes have better institutions and respect the rule of law (property rights, 
respect of contracts). Anderson & van Wincoop (2004) consider that direct policy 
instruments, such as tariffs, count less in transaction costs than other policies as “law 
enforcement and related property rights institutions, informational institutions, regulation”. 
Empirical evidences confirm that political freedom drives to good institutions (Clague & alii, 
1996; Dawson, 1998; Haan & Sturm, 2003) and that inadequate institutions constrain trade far 
more than tariffs do (Anderson & Marcouiller, 2002). Consequently, the transaction cost 
should be lower in democratic countries. For example, we can expect corruption to be less 
widespread. If democratic countries trade more intensively with each other, it is not only 
because their "natural" transaction costs (transport, common culture, etc.) are weaker, but also 
because being democratic induces pro-trade institutions and lower transaction costs.   
Empirical model and econometric estimations  
Most of the empirical studies rest on trade models, where the volume of trade is defined as the 
ratio of the sum of exports and imports to total GDP, and they use a simple indicator of 
democracy. These studies present methodological difficulties: for example, they ignore the 
endogeneity problem between trade and democracy; they also consider democracy as a 
unilateral characteristic of the importer or exporter, which acts in the same way for each 
bilateral relation.  
Very few empirical studies focus on the influence of political regimes on bilateral trade flows. 
Bliss & Russet (1998) like Mansfield, Milner & Rosendorff (2000) use gravity models to test 
this relation.    
Gravity models are usually derived from the "new international economy". But, they are also 
compatible with a HOS benchmark model as long as the specialization is total (Deardorff, 
1998), what is assumed by Duc, Granger & Siroën (2004).   4 
We use an Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) specification of the gravity model, which allows 
to make a distinction between the effects of the democracy on the volume of trade on one 
hand and on the bilateral trade flow on the other hand.   
Anderson & van Wincoop introduce the concept of multilateral resistance. The bilateral trade 
flows correspond to the equilibrium between the import demand from j addressed to i and the 
export supply from i towards j. In the first side, the tariff applied by the importer must be 
appreciated relatively to the tariff applied to all the other countries. If the country j increases 
its tariffs against all the countries except for i, the imports from i will increase although the 
tariff is hold constant. In the same way, an exporting country i increases its supply towards j if 
all the other partners increase their tariffs. Therefore, a given bilateral tariff is all the more 
restrictive since the "multilateral resistance"is weak
2.  
The equation to test is:  
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where Xij represents exports of country i to country j; Yi and Yj are the i and j national incomes 
(GDP);Yw is the world income and does not have to be estimated because it is constant.  
Pi and Pj are the national price index, which account for the "multilateral resistance": prices 
are all the higher since the multilateral resistance is strong. σ(> 1) is the elasticity of 
substitution between the product produced by i and the one produced by j. Anderson & van 
Wincoop propose an iterative method to estimate Pi and Pj,. Because this process is complex, 
and following the alternative method presented by the authors, empirical studies prefer to 
replace the computed price index by fixed effects, i.e. dummy variables that locate the 
exporting country and the importing country (see for example, Rose & van Wincoop, 2001; 
Subramanian & Wei, 2003). These fixed effects take into account all the "unilateral" 
characteristics of the countries (including the level of democracy). Thus, with this 
specification, we do not test directly the assumption that democratic countries trade more, but 
whether two democracies trade more with each other.  
In equation [2], βij represents the "natural" transaction costs between the exporter i and the 
importer  j. It includes transportation costs and the cultural community, like a common 
language. Proxy variables can take into account certain components of these costs (distance; 
the existence of a common borders…). tji represents the bilateral tariff applied by j to i and, by 
extension, the transaction costs influenced by the nature of the political regime. Since a 
decrease in βji or tji implies a rise in exports from i to j, our econometric model, which directly 
tests the influence of political regimes, may be considered as a reduced form of a bilateral 
trade equation.  
We estimate equation [2], in which various indicators of democracy in countries i and j are 
introduced in order to test the three theoretical hypothesis that have been previously 
discussed.
3  In equation [2], the exponent of the GDPs is equal to 1, so that it is strictly 
                                                 
2 This methodological choice presents the advantage to circumvent the endogeneity problem. Here, we are not in the case of bilateral 
variables as “common currency” which are exposed to the endogeneity problem because it is plausible that if A and B trade intensively they 
would adopt a common currency with a relatively high probability (see Anderson & van Wincoop, 2004). It is possible that multilateral 
openness “causes” democracy, but democracy is a variable concerning all bilateral relations. It is not because country A trade more with 
country B and less with C that it can be democratic with B and autocratic with C ! 
3We use the MCG method, the heteroscedasticity having been corrected by the White’s method.   5 
equivalent to let appear this product on the dependent variable side. The model can thus be 
rewritten 
Log(Xij/YiYj) = α1Log(Dij)+α2Demoij+ ijk
k
kZ ∑α +∑
i
i iDE α +∑
j
j jDI α +εij              [3] 
Xij = exports (F.O.B.) of country i to j, in current U.S. dollars = imports of country j from 
country i. 
Yi (Yj) =  GDP of country i (j), in U.S. current dollars. 
Dij = great arc circle kilometric distance between the two countries’ capitals. 
Demoij = a bilateral variable, which accounts for the respect of democracy in country i 
compared to j.  
Zijk =  k variables indicating a common element: a trade agreement, a common language or a 
common border. 
DEi (DIj) = exporter (importer) country-fixed effect. This dummy variable is equal to 1 if 
country i (country j) is the exporter (importer) country. 
εij = an error term.  
The three effects of the democracy on bilateral trade, discussed in the previous part, are 
represented by three different variables.   
According to relation 1, trade agreements requiring a mutual commitment to respect 
democratic values should be more favorable to trade than the others. We test this hypothesis 
introducing two variables into the equation. The first one, DA is a dummy variable, which 
represents the common membership to a trade agreement including a democratic clause. The 
second variable, NDA, represents the common membership to a non-democratic trade 
agreement. The benchmark situation corresponds to the absence of trade agreements. Thus the 
expected signs of the variables DA and NDA are both positive since trade agreement should 
always be favorable to bilateral trade, but the coefficient should be significantly higher for DA 
than for NDA.  
 Relation 2, summarized by equation 1, shows that the tariff of j towards i is an increasing 
(decreasing) function of transaction costs if the importing country j is democratic (autocratic). 
In order to check the relevance of this theoretical result, a second type of variable is tested: 
the bilateral distance between i and j multiplied by the index of democracy in the importing 
country j. Distance is here used like a proxy of transaction costs. Two variables of distance 
are thus created: one for the democratic importing countries and the other for the autocratic 
importing countries. In accordance with Relation 2, distance should have a more important 
negative impact on bilateral trade if the importing country is democratic. Democracy is 
approached by a dummy variable, built from the Freedom House’s indicators
4 in the 
following way: the countries in the sample are divided into two groups, democratic and 
autocratic, according to their note compared with the median.  
Relation 3 assesses that two democracies should trade more with each other because they bear 
weaker transaction costs. In order to confirm the existence of such an attraction effect, 
bilateral indicators of democracy are introduced in the equation. It deals with dummy 
variables, built from the Freedom House’s indicators and defined by: 
                                                 
4  This index is usually used in the literature (see for example, Granger and Siroën, 2001; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001). It includes two 
components, which both correspond to a note ranging from1 to 7: the first accounts for the respect of political freedom; the second for the 
respect of civil freedom. In this study, we only retain  the first component because it is nearest of our theoretical issue.  6 
-  FH0ij = 1 if the exporting country i and the importing country j are not democratic 
(autocratic). 
-  FH1ij = 1 if the exporting country i and the importing country j are democratic. 
The benchmark situation is a mixed case where only one partner is democratic. In accordance 
with the theoretical arguments, if transaction costs are lower in democracy, the expected sign 
is positive for FH1ij and negative for FH0ij. 
The model is initially estimated on the whole sample including 146 developed and developing 
countries, and for the year 2000. The three indicators of democracy are successively tested in 
the gravity model (table 1; models 1 to 3). The coefficients of DA  and  NDA  are both 
significant and positive but the latter is higher than the former: agreements that include a 
democratic clause are more favorable to bilateral trade. Our first results also confirm that the 
distance has a higher impact in democracies 
5. In the same way, the FH0ij  and  FH1ij 
coefficients are highly significant and, as expected, the first one is negative while the second 
one is positive. In a second time, the indicators of democracy are simultaneously introduced 
into the gravity model (table 1; model 4). They all keep their expected sign and remain highly 
significant. This result may be evidence that political regimes have different specific effects 
on bilateral trade. 
Table 1: The influence of democracy on bilateral trade flows 
Dependent variable: Log(Xij/YiYj) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Distance (LogDij) -0.72
***   -0.77
***  
Adjacency  0.95
*** 0.97
***  0.93
*** 1.00
***  
Common language   0.41
*** 0.41
*** 0.39
*** 0.41
***  
Common Free Trade Agreement 
  1.00
*** 1.01   
Democratic trade agreement (DA) 0.75
***     0.74
*** 
Non-democratic trade agreement 
(NDA) 
0.21
***     0.22
*** 
Democracy x Distance 
(FH1j* LogDij) 
 -0.84
***   -0.79
*** 
Autocracy x Distance 
(FH0j* LogDij) 
 -0.68
***   -0.58
*** 
Autocracy in i and j (FH0ij) 
   -2.40
*** -5.53
*** 
Democracy in i and j (FH1ij) 
   2.57
***  5.71
*** 
Exporter fixed effect (DEi) Yes   Yes  Yes 
Importer fixed effect (DIj) Yes    Yes Yes 
Number of observations  18832    18832  18832 
Fisher’s statistic  150.36  143.20  143.36  152.55 
Adjusted R²  0.703  0.703  0.702  0.705 
Note: 
***, 
** and 
* means the coefficient is significant respectively at 1, 5 and 10% level. Sources: Xij: FMI, 
Direction of Trade Statistics; Yi(Yj): World Bank, World Development indicators;  Dij,  Adjacency: CEPII 
database; Free Trade areas: CIA, World factbook; FH0ij and FH1ij: author’s computations from Freedom 
House database; DA and NDA, author’s building from different sources. 
                                                 
5  A Fisher’s test confirm that the coefficients of AD  compared with  AND  and  LogDij * FH1ij   compared with  LogDij * FH0ij  are 
significantly different at  1% level.   7 
However, the sensitivity of these first results must be tested. 
Firstly, we use a traditional specification of the gravity equation, where the product of the 
GDP appears as a dependent variable; fixed effects are dropped and we introduce a constant 
term (table 2  – model 5). Compared to the first model, this specification brings two 
differences: FH0ij is no longer significant and the impact of the distance is not significantly 
different for democracies and autocracies. A specification of the gravity model à la  Anderson 
& van Wincoop has thus few consequences on the results. However we prefer to keep this 
initial specification because it is more theoretically founded than the usual model.  
 
Table 2: The influence of democracy on bilateral trade flows 
(other specifications for the gravity equation) 
Dependant variable  LogXij   Log(Xij/YiYj)) 
  (5)  (6)  Monde-Sud (7)  Sud-Sud (8) 
GDP(YiYj) 0.53
***      
Adjacency  1.14
*** 0.90
***  1.03
*** 1.01
*** 
Common Language   0.54
*** 0.46
*** 0.48
*** 0.47
*** 
Democratic trade agreement (DA) 0.83
***  0.60
*** 1.86
*** 1.99
*** 
Non-democratic trade agreement 
(NDA) 
0.28
***  0.16
*** 0.08  0.20
* 
AutocracyxDistance (FH0j* LogDij) -0.56
***  -0.80
*** -0.76
***  
DemocracyxDistance (FH1j* LogDij) -0.55
***  -0.76
*** -0.74
***  
AutocracyxDistance (D012j* LogDij)   -0.65
***    
DemocracyxDistance (D345j* LogDij)   -0.86
***    
Autocracy in i and j (FH0ij) -0.01    -1.23
*** -2.43
*** 
Democracy in i and j (FH1ij) 0.16
***  1.24
*** 2.42
*** 
Autocracy in i and j (Dij012)   -0.14
***    
Democracy in i and j (Dij345)   0.14
***    
Exporter fixed effect (DEi) No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importer fixed effect (DIj) No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  18832  15181          15829  10598 
Constant -19.24
*** (0.24)      
Fisher’s statistic  2286.24  113.20  132.87  165.37 
Adjusted R²  0.651  0.669  0.699  0.757 
Note: 
***, 
** and 
* means the coefficient is significant respectively at 1, 5 and 10% level. 
Sources: Idem Table 1; Dij012 and Dij0345:  authors from the Polity IV database. 
 
Secondly, we test the sensitivity of our results compared with the indicator of democracy 
used. In model (6), the estimation is made with the indicator, PARCOMP, derived from the 
Polity IV database. PARCOMP ranks the countries from 0 to 5, according to their degree of 
political pluralism. The original indicator is unilateral. We thus transformed it into two 
dummy bilateral variables: Dij012 equals 1 when the two partners are autocratic and Dij345 8 
equals 1 when they are democratic. To preserve the homogeneity of the different estimations, 
the indicator PARCOMP in the importing country j is also used to multiply the distance. 
Compared to the previous indicator, PARCOMP rates a higher number of countries as 
democratic, what could explain why the coefficients of the democratic indicators are lower for 
Dij012 and Dij345 and for DA and NDA
6. Despite those modifications, our conclusions on the 
positive incidence of democratic regimes on the bilateral trade are preserved.  
Thirdly, we test the stability of the model relatively to the size of the sample. To do so, two 
new dummy variables have been introduced in the benchmark model: the first one indicates 
that bilateral trade flows concern a developing country with a developed country. The second 
variable indicates a South-South trade relation; North-North relations are used as the 
benchmark situation. These two variables being significant at the 1% threshold, we can 
conclude that our model is not stable and must be re-estimated on different subsamples
7.  
Political economy models à la Mayer envisage a different relation between democracy and 
trade policies depending on whether the country is a north capital-abundant one or a South 
labor-abundant one
8. So, the analysis is now reduced to bilateral trade flows, only implying 
importing southern countries. We first make estimations when all countries export to southern 
countries (model 7); then we reduce the sample once more because only South-South relations 
are considered (model 8). In both cases, the variables of democracy keep the right sign and 
remain highly significant. The positive impact of democracy on bilateral trade flows is thus 
confirmed in the peculiar case of developing countries. However, compared to the benchmark 
model, reducing the size of the sample makes the coefficients of FH0ij and FH1ij in the 
models (7) and (8) increasingly lower and the coefficient of DA  increasingly higher. 
Moreover, in both cases, there is no more significant difference between the impact of 
distance for democratic importing countries and for autocratic ones..  
Conclusion 
There is econometric evidence that the nature of political regimes into two partners influences 
their bilateral trade. Countries committed in a free trade agreement with democratic 
constraints trade significantly more than the others. The relation is even stronger for the 
importing developing countries. In accordance with the predictions of political economy 
models, distance is more trade reducing between democratic countries. However, this 
influence disappears when the importer is a developing country. Lastly, there is evidence that 
democratic countries trade more with each other than "mixed" countries and, a fortiori, 
autocratic countries. Coefficients of bilateral variables representing democracy are 
particularly high and robust. The hypothesis according to which transaction costs are weaker 
between democracies is thus reinforced. These three effects appear independent. These results 
require to be consolidated by a panel analysis. 
 
                                                 
6 The different possible thresholds have been tested and the coefficients change as waited : a larger definition of democracy decreases the 
coefficient of FH1ij. 
7  The results corresponding to this estimation are not reported here because the introduction of these two dummy variables into the 
benchmark model does not modify the previous conclusions. In particular, the coefficients of various democracy variables keep the same 
sign.  
8 Democratic developed countries would be protectionist and democratic developing countries would be free trader, what is questioned by 
Duc, Granger and Siroën (2004).  9 
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Annex 1 : Synthetic indicator of democracy. 
 
 
We report here the countries classification according to our unilateral indicator of democracy. 
 
FH0 (autocratic)  FH1 (democratic) 
    Albania     Kyrgyz Republic      Argentina     Italy 
    Algeria     Lao People's Dem.Rep      Australia     Jamaica 
    Angola     Lebanon      Austria     Japan 
    Azerbaijan     Macedonia, FYR      Bahamas, The     Korea 
    Bahrain, Kingdom of     Malawi      Bangladesh     Latvia 
    Belarus     Malaysia      Barbados     Lithuania 
    Burkina Faso     Mauritania      Belgium-Lux.     Madagascar 
    Burundi     Morocco      Belize     Mali 
    Cambodia     Niger      Benin     Malta 
    Cameroon     Nigeria      Bolivia     Mauritius 
    Canada     Oman      Brazil     Mexico 
    Central African Rep.     Pakistan      Bulgaria     Moldova 
    Chad     Paraguay      Cape Verde     Mongolia 
    China     Russia      Chile     Nepal 
    Colombia     Rwanda      Costa Rica     Netherlands 
    Congo, Dem. Rep. of     Saudi Arabia      Croatia     New Zealand 
    Congo, Republic of     Senegal      Cyprus     Norway 
    Côte d'Ivoire     Sierra Leone      Czech Republic     Panama 
    Djibouti     Singapore      Denmark     Papua New Guinea 
    Egypt     Sudan      Dominica     Peru 
    Equatorial Guinea     Syrian Arab Republic      Dominican Rep.     Philippines 
    Ethiopia     Tajikistan      Ecuador     Poland 
    Fiji     Tanzania      El Salvador     Portugal 
    Gabon     Togo      Estonia     Romania 
    Gambia, The     Tunisia      Finland     Samoa 
    Georgia     Turkey      France     Slovak Republic 
    Guinea     Turkmenistan      Germany     Slovenia 
    Guinea-Bissau     Uganda      Ghana     South Africa 
    Haiti     Ukraine      Greece     Spain 
    Indonesia     Uzbekistan      Grenada     Sri Lanka 
    Iran, I.R. of     Venezuela      Guatemala     Sweden 
    Jordan     Vietnam      Guyana     Switzerland 
    Kazakhstan     Yemen, Republic of      Honduras     Thailand 
    Kenya     Yugoslavia, SFR      Hungary     Trinidad and To. 
    Kuwait     Zambia      Iceland     United Kingdom 
      Zimbabwe      India     United States 
         Ireland     Uruguay 
         Israel    
Source : Freedom House, Freedom in the world country ratings, 1972-73 to 2001-2002. 
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Annex 2 : Data Sources and Description 
 
Variable Name : Bilateral exports (Xij) 
Description: Bilateral exports of the country i to the country j, in F.O.B terms and in U.S. current $, 
year 2000. 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
 
Variable Name : GDP 
Description: Gross Domestic Product in U.S. current $. Average for 1999-2001. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 
 
Variable Name : Bilateral Distance (Dij) 
Description: Great arc circle kilometric distance between the two capitals of countries i and j. 
Source: CEPII database, http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/bdd.htm 
 
Variable Name : Common Language 
Description: Dummy variable equals 1 if countries i and j share the same language. 
Source: CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html 
 
Variable Name : Adjacency 
Description: Dummy variable equals 1 if countries i and j share a common border. 
Source: CEPII database, , http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/bdd.htm 
 
Variable Name : Freedom House indicator of political rights enforcement (FH) 
Description: Index ranking from 0 (no respect) to 1 (total respect) of political rights 
Source: Freedom House Data, http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm 
 
Variable Name : Unilateral autocracy indicator (FH0) 
Description: Index equal to 1 if the political rights index (FH) is lower than the median of FH for the 
whole sample 
Source: Authors’ computations from Freedom House Data.. 
 
Variable Name : Unilateral democracy  indicator (FH1) 
Description: Index equal to 1 if the political rights index (FH) is equal or greater than the median of 
FH for the whole sample 
Source: Authors’ computations from Freedom House Data.. 
 
Variable Name : Bilateral autocracy indicator (FH0ij) 
Description: Dummy variable equals 1 if FH0 equal 0 for countries i and  j. 
Source: Authors’ computations from Freedom House Data.. 
 
Variable Name : Bilateral democracy indicator (FH1ij)  
Description: Dummy variable equals 1 if FH1 equals 1 for the country i and j. 
Source: Authors’ computations from Freedom House Data. 
 
Variable Name : Common Free Trade Agreement  
Description: Dummy variable equals 1 if countries i and j are members of a same trade agreement 
Source: CIA World Factbook, Frankel, J.A., 1997. Regional Trading Blocs in the World Trading 
System. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. 
 
Variable Name : Democratic Agreement (DA) 
Description: Dummy variable equals 1 if countries i and j are members of a same free trade agreement 
which includes a democratic clause.  
Source: Authors’database (see annex 3) 
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Variable Name : Non-Democratic Agreement (NDA) 
Description: Dummy variable equals 1 if countries i and j are members of a same free trade agreement 
which has no democratic clause. 
Source: Authors’ database (see annex 3) 
 
Variable Name : PARCOMP 
Description: Index, ranging from 0 to 5 (competitive), according to “the extent to which alternative 
preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena”.  
Source: Polity IV database,  http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ 
 
Variable Name : Bilateral autocracy indicator (D012ij) 
Description: Dummy variable equals 1 if PARCOMP equals 0, 1 or 2 for countries i and  j. 
Source: Authors’ computations from Polity IV database. 
 
Variable Name : Bilateral democracy indicator (D345ij)  
Description: Dummy variable equals 1 if PARCOMP equals 3, 4 or 5 for the country i and j. 
Source: Authors’ computations from Polity IV database. 
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Annex 3 : Regional Organization and Democratic Constraints. 
 
We only care about preferential regional trade agreements like Customs Unions, Common Market or 
Free Trade Area. All other types of trade agreements (Generalized System of Preference and other 
unilateral preferential trade agreements, Sectorial Agreements) are not included. 
 
The list of Regional Organizations with democratic constraints and Organizations without democratic 
constraints is reported below. Democratic constraints means that either democracy is a necessity to 
join the Organization, or the promotion of democracy is one of the organization’s aim, or there exists 
sanctions in case of no-democratic  political change. All these information have been collected by 
Cindy Duc in each Organizations’ treaties and protocols.  
 
 
 
 
 
Organizations with democratic 
constraints  
 
 
Organizations without democratic 
constraints 
 
 
European Union 
 
European Free trade Agreement 
 
Central European Free Trade Agreement 
 
NAFTA 
 
Andean Pact 
 
Mercosur 
 
ASEAN 
 
CACM 
 
CARICOM 
 
UDEAC (Economic and Customs Union of 
the Central African States) 
 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
 
Arab Common Market 
 
Mano River Union 
 
WAEMU (West African Economic and 
Monetary Union) 
 
 